HUJAHAN RAYUAN SEKSYEN 39A(1) AKTA DADAH BERBAHAYA

PENGHUJAHAN PIHAK PERAYU

PEMBUKAAN

1) Rayuan oleh pihak Perayu adalah terhadap keputusan Majistret yang telah mensabitkan Perayu di bawah Seksyen 6 Akta Dadah Berbahaya yang dihukum di bawah Seksyen 39A(1) Akta yang sama. Majistret telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 24 bulan dari tarikh sabitan dan 3 kali sebatan.

2)    Perayu dalam kes ini telah didakwa bersama-sama dengan 4 lagi tertuduh yang telah dilepas dan dibebaskan di akhir kes pendakwaan. Pertuduhan yang dikemukakan adalah seperti berikut; 

HUJAHAN PERAYU

Alasan para (a) hingga (f) Petisyen Perayu; Majistret terkhilaf apabila memutuskan pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie.

1)  Pertamanya, Majistret telah khilaf apabila bersandarkan kepada keterangan dengar cakap (hearsay).

2)    Secara asasnya, Majistret telah mendapati adanya kes prima facie terhadap Perayu atas 3 sebab; adanya maklumat tentang pengedaran dadah terhadap Perayu, kedudukan Perayu yang dekat dengan barang kes dadah dan fakta Perayu merupakan penyewa kepada premis. Pohon rujuk m/s 24 hingga 26 Jilid 1 Rekod Rayuan.

 

3)    Keterangan berkaitan kewujudan maklumat ini boleh dilihat melalui keterangan SP2 di m/s 56 Jilid 2 Rekod Rayuan. SP2 mengatakan beliau telah terima satu maklumat tentang pengedaran ganja oleh 1 lelaki Melayu yang dikenali sebagai XXX

4) Hujah- kedudukan autoriti mengenai kemasukan maklumat ini adalah jelas. Ia merupakan satu keterangan dengar cakap melainkan pemberi maklumat (informer) dipanggil menjadi saksi. Dalam kes ini, pemberi maklumat tidak dipanggil untuk menerangkan mengenai maklumat tersebut. Oleh itu ia kekal menjadi keterangan hearsay yang tidak sepatutnya diterima masuk (inadmissible).

5)    Rujuk kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Leong Hong Khie v PP [1986] 2 MLJ 206 [TAG 1];

“These were appeals against the conviction of the appellants on a charge of trafficking in a dangerous drug. The principal evidence against the appellants was given by a Senior Customs Officer who stated that he acted on information from informers. It was sought at the trial to introduce evidence of oral statements made to the witness by two informers, neither of whom was called to testify. The defence objected to the evidence on the ground that it contravened the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence and also because it did not fall within any of the recognised exceptions thereto. The learned trial judge ruled that the statements were admissible and convicted the appellants – See [1985] 1 MLJ 355. The appellants appealed.

Held:

(1) the general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible as proof of a fact which has been stated by a third person. In Malaysia certain exceptions have been set out in Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1950, but these statutory provisions were not relied in this case;

(2) the general proposition laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 220 must be read subject to this condition viz. that the statement must be directly relevant in considering the state of mind of the witness to whom it is made. In other words the proposition could only apply when the mental state of the witness evidenced by the statement was itself directly in issue at the trial;

(3) in this case the prosecution had failed to satisfy this strict test. Since the mental state of both the appellants was not in issue at the trail, the condition had not been satisfied. All the statements allegedly made by the informers to the witness are to be treated as hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible in law and ought to have been rejected by the learned trial judge;

(4) none of the reasons given by the learned judge come within the statutory exception to the hearsay rule contained in section 32 of theEvidence Act 1950 and the res gestae rule does not and cannot apply to the facts of the case;

(5) the hearsay evidence of the informers was so interwoven with the testimony of the principal prosecution witness that its misreception had seriously prejudiced the fair trial of the appellants and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Having regard to the other oral evidence, it would be unsafe to allow the conviction to stand, as there was no satisfactory oral evidence to support the conviction.”

6)  Hujah- jelas satu kegagalan keadilan telah berlaku akibat Perayu diprejudiskan daripada mendapat perbicaraan yang adil. Oleh itu adalah tidak selamat untuk membenarkan sabitan dikekalkan.

7)    Rujuk juga kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Alcontara a/l Ambrose Anthony v PP [1996] 1 MLJ 209 [TAG 2];

“The penultimate point which arose for consideration concerned the admission of certain irrelevant, inadmissible and gravely prejudicial evidence, to wit, that part of the testimony of ASP Abdul Wahab wherein he gave an account of the briefing he had given his men on the night before he had mounted the road block to stop and search the car driven by the appellant; more particularly, he said this, 'I informed them [his men] that information had been received that a certain Indian would be travelling in a blue Colt Gallant Mitsubishi WBE 2789 and transporting dadah, proceeding from kawasan Permatang Bendahari towards Pulau Pinang.' Now, this statement by ASP Abdul Wahab was clearly based on hearsay, was prejudicial to the appellant, and therefore, inadmissible. Although no objection had been raised to the admission of this inadmissible evidence, the judge was nevertheless under an automatic duty to stop it from being adduced for inadmissible evidence does not become admissible by reason of failure to object.

In Vijayaratnam v PP [1926] 28 MLJ 106, M Hashim J had to consider a similar point, and went so far as to say (at p 106 col 2D):

I think, if possible, the expression 'on information received' should not be used by police officers when giving evidence. It would appear to mean that somebody has given information, which may be hearsay, to the police and the police act on this information. In this particular case, the police witness went on to say that on arrival at the scene, he laid an ambush. This statement, read in conjunction with the expression 'on information received', would tend to indicate that the police had been told that an offence would be committed. In my opinion, this would, to say the least, cloud the issue when the trial commenced and it might to a certain degree prejudice the court against the appellant. To put it in another way, there was a probability that the court trying the appellant was, to a certain extent, influenced by the opening statement of the police witness. In my opinion, such a state of affairs should be avoided.

Whilst we agree with much of what M Hashim J said in that case, we consider that in appropriate circumstances, there is nothing objectionable in a law enforcement officer saying, by way of introduction that, 'acting on information received', he took certain steps in the investigation. However, when such testimony is given, care must be taken not to divulge the contents of the information, as happened in the present case, since this may well be open to the objection that it is hearsay and, in all probability, prejudicial to the accused. Moreover, we must mention that in trials for any offence under the Act, sub-ss (1) and (2) of s 40 provide for special rules of evidence relating to the protection of informers — but note the exception provided for under sub-s (3) of s 40.”

8)    Pohon juga merujuk kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Chan King Yu v PP [2009] 1 MLJ 457 [TAG 3] di mana tertuduh juga telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan kerana penerimaan keterangan hearsay;

“ [70] It was argued for the appellant that the learned trial judge and the Court of Appeal judges had misdirected themselves in admitting hearsay evidence and other inadmissible evidence which was highly prejudicial to the appellant. It was submitted that in respect of some of the admitted evidence there were elements of higher prejudice than probative value and the court ought to have exercised its discretion to exclude them. It was contended for the appellant that the prejudicial element is that the police were acting on information received by ASP Giam Kar Hoon (PW7) from an informant that on 19 June 2000 a Chinese male from Hong Kong by the name of Chan King Yu would be trafficking in a dangerous drug ('syabu') at Hotel Nova, Kuala Lumpur. Based on this information PW7 assembled his team to raid the said hotel room occupied by the appellant.

[71] It can be gathered from the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses that the police team were in fact acting on information received to effect the arrest and detention of the appellant. PW7 in his evidence, inter alia, had stated as follows:

(i) Sebelum tugas serbuan, pagi hari tersebut saya telah menerima maklumat dari sumber. Maklumat darinya mengatakan satu rakyat lelaki Cina Hong Kong bernama Chan King Yu akan mengedar dadah syabu di sebuah Hotel di Kuala Lumpur … Dalam lebih kurang 12.10 tengahari sumber telah menalipon saya dan telah beri nama hotel tersebut, iaitu Hotel Nova.

(ii) Selain dari menyerbu di premis disyaki bilik hotel saya telah beri description sasaran kami, iaitu lelaki Cina bernama Chan King Yu, serta dengan gambarnya. Saya boleh tunjuk gambar sasaran … This is the original copy yang diberi oleh sumber saya … Saya beri salinan photocopy kepada anggota saya. Saya terima gambar ini pada hari kejadian jam lebih kurang pukul 8 lebih.

(iii) Saya nampak yang buka pintu tersebut adalah lelaki Cina merupai sasaran kami.

[72] L/Cpl Samsudin bin Jantan (PW4) in his evidence stated as follows:

ASP Giam memberitahu siapanya suspek, iaitu, satu lelaki Cina bernama Chan King Yu rakyat Hong Kong berada di sekitar Kuala Lumpur. Pemerhatian ini adalah berkenaan kegiatan pengedaran dadah. Arahan adalah buat pemerhatian di Hotel Nova, Jalan Bukit Bintang. Lepas itu, saya lihat satu lelaki bangsa Cina seperti deskripsi yang diberi oleh ASP Giam melalui gambar yang ia beri turun dari Hotel Nova.

 [73] L/Cpl Abdul Halim bin Basri (PW5) in his evidence stated as follows:

(i) Operasi yang diketuai oleh ASP Giam untuk membuat tangkapan ke atas seorang lelaki Cina rakyat Hong Kong di sebuah hotel di Jalan Alor, Bukit Bintang. Ia Hotel Nova.

(ii) ASP Giam arah untuk standby kerana ada maklumat seorang bangsa Cina lelaki rakyat Hong Kong ada membawa dadah jenis syabu ke kawasan Bukit Bintang. Masa taklimat saya diberitahu ada orang akan membawa syabu.

 [74] The learned trial judge in his judgment on this issue of acting on information received had stated as follows:

Keterangan menunjukkan tertuduh adalah sasaran pihak polis dalam operasi ini dari sejak awal. Pihak polis telah menerima maklumat bahawa seorang lelaki Cina dari Hong Kong akan mengedar dadah 'syabu' pada hari itu dan telah menerima salinan portret tertuduh.

The Court of Appeal in its judgment had also likewise stated as follows:

On the morning of 19 June 2000 ASP Giam Kar Hoon (PW7) from the Narcotics Division of Bukit Aman received information that a Chinese male from Hong Kong by the name of Chang King Yu would be trafficking in dangerous drug at a hotel in Kuala Lumpur on that day.

 [75] I am of the view from the above quoted findings in the judgment of the courts it can be said that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had acted on statements which were clearly hearsay and prejudicial to the appellant and therefore inadmissible.”

9)  Hujah- keadaan yang lebih kurang sama wujud dalam kes kita. SP2 memberitahu beliau bertindak atas maklumat. Manakala SP4 memberi keterangan mengenai gambar sasaran. Namun, dalam kes di atas yang mana gambar dikemukakan sekalipun, masih lagi Mahkamah Persekutuan mendapati keterangan tersebut sebagai “clearly hearsay and prejudicial to the appellant and therefore inadmissible.”

10)Hujah- Majistret telah menjadikan maklumat ini sebagai sebab utama untuk membuat dapatan adanya pemilikan terhadap Perayu. Oleh itu tidak timbul isu bahawa Majistret tidak terpengaruh dengan keterangan yang inadmissible dalam membuat dapatan.

11) Hujah- penerimaan masuk keterangan hersay ini juga adalah sangat prejudicial kepada Perayu kerana beliau sahaja yang bernama XXX semasa serbuan sedangkan kedudukan beliau adalah sama dengan 3 penyewa lain dan juga faktor kedekatan dengan barang kes (proximity) yang juga sama dengan 4 OKT lain.

12) Keadaan mungkin berbeza sekiranya hanya Perayu seorang sahaja yang ditangkap dalam serbuan tersebut. Begitu juga sekiranya keterangan adalah overwhelming terhadap Perayu walaupun wujud tangkapan lain seperti adanya conduct Perayu yang menunjukkan pengetahuan. Begitu juga jika Perayu seorang sahaja yang menyewa atau barang kes dijumpai pada milikan fizikal Perayu. Kesemua keadaan seperti di atas tidak wujud dalam kes ini. 

13)Walaupun pendakwaan memanggil SP4 yang dikatakan membuat pemerhatian terhadap sasaran seorang lelaki bernama XXX, fakta yang tidak dapat disangkal adalah SP4 juga bukan pemberi maklumat tersebut. SP4 mengatakan beliau juga dimaklumkan oleh SP2 mengenai maklumat tersebut. Oleh itu ia kekal menjadi hearsay. Rujuk keterangan SP4 di m/s 81 Jilid 2 Rekod Rayuan.

17) Hujah- dapatan Majistret yang bergantung kepada keterangan hersay ini adalah satu salah arah yang serius yang mewajarkan gangguan di pihak Mahkamah ini.

18)Keterangan yang lebih mustahak daripada SP4 adalah kesemua tertuduh tidak membawa apa-apa barang salah semasa balik ke kondo semasa beliau membuat pemerhatian pada hari kejadian. Rujuk m/s 84 Jilid 2 Rekod Rayuan. Keterangan yang memihak kepada Perayu ini tidak juga dipertimbangkan oleh Majistret.

  

23) Seterusnya, Majistret turut bergantung kepada keterangan yang inadmissible iaitu rakaman percakapan Perayu. Pohon rujuk Alasan Majistret di m/s 105 dan juga 107 Jilid 1 Rekod Rayuan. Majistret dengan jelas mengambilkira keterangan yang inadmissible iaitu sasaran adalah OKT 1 mengikut rakaman percakapan. Ini adalah salah arah yang serius dan sekali lagi memprejudiskan Perayu.

24)Sedangkan di dalam keterangan SP2 di m/s 56 Jilid 2 Rekod Rayuan mengesahkan tiadanya kata-kata amaran dikemukakan oleh beliau di lokasi kejadian. Pihak pendakwaan juga tidak pernah cuba memasukkan rakaman percakapan mana-mana OKT sebagai keterangan.

25) Keduanya, Majistret terkhilaf berkenaan dapatan dan penemuan fakta kenapa Perayu dikatakan mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan.

26)Selain daripada bersandar kepada keterangan hearsay, Majistret turut bersandar kepada fakta bahawa perayu adalah penyewa premis tersebut.

27) Keterangan SP1 selaku tuan rumah di m/s 48 Jilid 1 Rekod Rayuan mengesahkan bahawa penyewa premis seramai 4 orang iaitu XXX. Bahkan SP1 turut mengesahkan bahawa orang yang membuat pembayaran adalah OKT 2. Rujuk m/s 52 Jilid 1 Rekod Rayuan.

 

28) Keterangan SP1 ini disokong melalui tenancy agreement iaitu ekshibit P1. SP2 juga sahkan beliau sewakan premis kepada 4 orang serta maklumkan pernah pergi ke rumah pada bulan Disember dan dapati ada lebih dari 10 orang.

29) Hujah- dapatan Majistret iaitu adanya kawalan dan jagaan Perayu terhadap barang kes dadah kerana beliau adalah penyewa; adalah bertentangan dengan keterangan. Jika itulah dapatan Majistret, bagaimana pula kedudukannya dengan 3 penyewa lagi?

30) Penama XXX adalah merupakan tertuduh kedua dan ketiga di dalam kes ini. Kedudukan mereka semasa serbuan juga adalah sama menurut SP2. Bahkan conduct mereka semasa serbuan yang tidak berbuat apa-apa juga adalah sama dengan Perayu. Majistret tidak langsung mengarahkan pemikiran beliau kepada fakta ini.

31) Manakala penama XXX juga salah seorang daripada penyewa premis tersebut. Saksi ini tidak pernah dipanggil oleh pendakwaan untuk eliminate pemilikan beliau ke atas barang kes. Tidak ada apa-apa keterangan dikemukakan di peringkat kes pendakwaan mengenai saksi ini.

32) Hujah- pemakaian Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan wajar terpakai ke atas pihak pendakwaan kerana gagal memanggil saksi ini. Gap yang wujud di sini tidak menjadi tugas dan tanggungjawab di pihak pembelaan mengisinya. Wujud juga elemen suppression kerana penama ini adalah adik kepada Perayu yang mungkin memberikan keterangan yang memihak kepada Perayu jika dipanggil.

33) Pohon rujuk kes Mahkamah Rayuan Ibrahim Mohamad & Anor v PP [2011] 4 CLJ 113 [TAG 4];:

34) Peranan penama XXX lebih material jika diteliti keterangan SP5 iaitu IO kes di m/s 100 Jilid 2 Rekod Rayuan. SP5 telah mengesahkan tiada rampasan kunci pada Perayu dan ada satu lagi penghuni bernama XXX Menurut IO mungkin beliau ke unit selepas kejadian dan telah mengambil kunci.

35) Hujah- kesemua keterangan yang memihak kepada Perayu mengenai isu sewaan itu tidak langsung dipertimbangkan oleh Majistret. Tidak ditunjukkan di mana-mana bahawa beliau telah mengambilkira bahawa Perayu bukanlah satu-satunya penyewa. Versi adanya lebih dari satu penyewa ini adalah naratif kes pendakwaan sendiri dan bukannya versi yang dicadangkan oleh Perayu.

36) Selain itu, Majistret turut bersandar kepada keterangan bahawa perayu ada bersama barang salah dalam jarak yang dekat. Apa yang gagal dipertimbangkan oleh Majistret adalah kedudukan keempat-empat lagi Perayu semasa serbuan adalah sama. Tidak berlaku keadaan di mana contohnya hanya Perayu yang dijumpai dengan barang salah atau Perayu sahaja di dalam bilik yang ada di dalamnya barang salah.

37) Pohon rujuk m/s 26 Jilid 2 Rekod Rayuan iaitu keterangan SP2 yang mengatakan kedudukan kesemua 5 tangkapan adalah sama iaitu berada di ruang tamu. Apakah yang membezakan Perayu dengan 4 tangkapan yang lain? Sewajarnya dapatan yang sama dibuat oleh Majistret terhadap kesemua tertuduh jika alasan proximity menjadi sandaran.

38) Selain itu, Majistret juga gagal mengarahkan pemikiran kepada keterangan IO SP5 di m/s 94 Jilid 2 Rekod Rayuan yang mengesahkan bahawa tiada kunci atau kad akses dirampas daripada sesiapa. Juga tiada apa-apa barang peribadi sesiapa dirampas daripada lokasi kejadian.

39) Hujah- kegagalan Majistret untuk mempertimbangkan keseluruhan aspek keterangan termasuklah yang memihak kepada Perayu juga merupakan satu salah arah. Hujahkan ini bukanlah maximum evaluation.

40) Hujah- dapatan adanya kawalan dan jagaan di m/s 26 JIlid 1 Rekod Rayuan adalah bertentangan dengan keterangan atau tidak diasaskan atas keseluruhan fakta. Keadaan berbeza jika kedudukan perayu saja yang hampir atau pendakwaan telah berjaya untuk eliminate atau exclude possibility of access bagi 4 lagi tertuduh.

41) Pohon juga rujuk kes PP v Chang Kok Foo [2016] 7 MLJ 67 [TAG 5];

“Held, acquitting and discharging the accused without calling for his defence on both charges:

(1) The drugs were found in the hollow of the dressing table chair and therefore it was not visible to anyone who was in the room. Although clothing was seized from the room, no clothes fitting exercise was carried out to see if it fitted the accused. No keys to the padlock were found on the accused. For that matter, no keys to the room were recovered. A wedding photograph was found in the room and adduced to court to show that the accused was occupying the room with his wife. However, no documentary or oral evidence was adduced to show who was the registered owner of the house and neither was there any evidence produced to show who was the tenant or subtenant, if any (see para 32).

(2) Even if the accused had known the presence of the drugs in the hollow of the dressing table chair, this would have been insufficient to establish that he was in possession or in control of it, given that his wife and daughter also had unrestricted access to the room. The possibility that either one of them had concealed the drugs there could not be excluded. The prosecution failed to prove that there was exclusivity of possession on the part of the accused and that he had power of disposal over the impugned drugs to the exclusion of others. The prosecution also failed to adduce any fingerprint evidence or DNA evidence to link the accused to the drugs (see paras 61 & 63).

(3) Under s 8 of the Evidence Act 1950, the conduct of an accused ie absconding, nervousness, restlessness and other like behaviour is admissible as a relevant fact. Under s 9, facts which support or rebut an inference suggested by such conduct is relevant. The evidence that the accused was worried ‘cemas’ and restless, ‘gelisah’ was conduct of an equivocal nature at best. Any reasonable person upon realising that incriminating evidence or objects were discovered are naturally inclined to display similar reaction what more when his arrest immediately followed such discovery. The reaction displayed by the accused was equally consistent with that of a person who had just discovered that incriminating articles were present in the very room he was found in. In all the circumstances of this case, it was unsafe to conclude that such reaction constituted evidence of knowledge on the part of the accused that there were drugs in the dressing table chair (see paras 36–37).

(4) Mere proximity or juxtaposition of the accused to the drugs without more was insufficient to fasten possession upon the accused. In the circumstances, the prosecution failed to prove that the accused had knowledge of the drugs found in the room and failed to prove that the accused was in possession of the said drugs (see para 66).”

Majistret telah tersalah arah berkenaan beban di akhir kes pembelaan.

51) Merujuk m/s 26 Jiid 1 Rekod Rayuan, jelas Majistret telah menggunakan anggapan di bawah Seksyen 37(d) untuk dapati adanya pengetahuan di pihak Perayu di akhir kes pendakwaan.

52)Sebaliknya, di akhir kes pendakwaan juga, tidak ada apa-apa dapatan bahawa bahawa wujudnya pengetahuan di pihak Perayu melalui keterangan terus ataupun melalui inferens daripada keterangan atau conduct Perayu.

53) Namun, jika diteliti alasan Majistret di akhir kes pembelaan pula iaitu di m/s 34 Jilid 1 Rekod Rayuan, Majistret hanya memperturunkan alasan seperti berikut;

“Di akhir kes pembelaan ini, berdasarkan keseluruhan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan pembelaan serta ekshibit yang dikemukakan, Mahkamah telah mencapai keputusan bahawa OKT didapati salah seperti pertuduhan yang dibuat ke atas beliau.”

54) Hujah- wujud salah arah yang serius di mana Majistret telah gagal untuk membuat apa-apa dapatan samada pembelaan Perayu berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah atau sebaliknya. Adalah jelas Majistret telah gagal mematuhi panduan yang diberikan dalam kes Mahkamah Agung, Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v Public Prosecutor [1991] 3 MLJ 169 [TAG 7];

“Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) Even though a judge does not accept or believe the accused's explanation, the accused must not be convicted until the court is satisfied for sufficient reason that such explanation does not cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution case.

(2) Where the prosecution relies on available statutory presumptions to prove one or more of the essential ingredients of the charge, the particular burden of proof, as opposed to the general burden, shifts to the defence to rebut such presumptions on the balance of probabilities which from the defence point of view is heavier than the burden of casting a reasonable doubt but it is certainly lighter than the burden of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt.

(3) Unless the evidence in a particular case does not obviously so warrant, it is incumbent for the court to consider whether on balance of probability the defence has rebutted the statutory presumptions of trafficking under s 37(da) of the Act as a separate exercise even though the court is satisfied on balance that the presumption of possession under s 37(d) of the Act has not been rebutted. In this case the failure to do so was a material misdirection and was fatal to the conviction.

(4) The learned trial judge has acted on the wrong premise that once the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption under s 37(d) of the Act, the presumption under s 37(da) of the Act had also not been rebutted. On the facts of this particular case this error of law had occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”

55) Hujah- walau bagaimana lemah sekalipun pembelaan itu, ia tidak wajar diketepikan begitu sahaja tanpa diberikan pertimbangan sewajarnya. Pohon rujuk kes Mahkamah Rayuan, Chan Chor Shuh v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 2 MLJ 26 [TAG 8];

“The law requires a trial judge to consider all of the evidence that has been adduced in support of the defence. A court must consider carefully whether a defence put forward is capable of raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case; Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v Public Prosecutor [1991] 3 MLJ 169 followed. In a suitable case, a court must consider a defence even if it has not been specifically raised; R v Porrit (1961) 45 Cr App Rep 348 followed. On the facts, the Court of Appeal could not agree with the trial judge's treatment of the defence especially in respect of the role of Wong. Even though there was a paucity of evidence of whether Wong was an agent provocateur, he should have been produced as a prosecution witness or at least offered to the defence in view of the roles that he played. Wong was present at the time of arrest. There was communication between him and the appellant prior to the appellant's arrest and he had arranged the rendezvous with the appellant. Wong was also essential to the unfolding of the narrative of the prosecution's case, and the trial judge's rejection of the need to call him based on the fact that he was an informer was misplaced (see pp 33B, E, G-H, 34C).”

56)Selanjutnya, wujud kekhilafan juga apabila Majistret gagal mempertimbangkan samada pembelaan Perayu berupaya mematahkan anggapan di bawah Seksyen 37(d) atau sebaliknya. Seperti dihujahkan di atas, di akhir kes pendakwaan Majistret telah mendapati adanya elemen pengetahuan atas anggapan Seksyen 37(d).

57) Hujah- ini adalah satu salah arah yang serius apabila Hakim Bicara gagal mengarahkan fikiran di akhir kes samada pembelaan berjaya mematahkan anggapan atau tidak. Rujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan, Ooi Hock Kheng v PP [2014] 5 MLJ 585 [TAG 9].

“[12] There is another reason why we had allowed this appeal. At the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, the learned JC had invoked s 37(d) of the DDA to prove possession of the appellant of the Ketamine in the plastic bag. The statutory presumption of possession under s 37(d)is a rebuttable presumption. For this reason, it is incumbent on the learned JC to consider at the end of the whole case whether the presumption that he invoked had been rebutted on a balance of probabilities. A reading of the judgment of the learned JC shows that he had failed to direct his mind on this point. This is a serious misdirection as the law requires the learned JC to make such a finding when he resorted to the presumption under s 37(d) of the DDA (see Alcontara a/l Ambross Anthony v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 MLJ 209; [1996] 1 CLJ 705, Tan Boon Kean v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 MLJ 514; [1995] 4 CLJ 456 and Public Prosecutor v Ku Yahya Ku Bahari & Anor [2002] 1 CLJ 113).”

58) Hujahkan keadaan yang sama berlaku dalam kes Seyedarileza Seyedhedayatollah Ehteshamiardestani v PP [2014] 4 CLJ 406 [Tag 10]. Hakim telah gagal untuk apply test of balance of probabilities dalam menentukan samada Perayu telah mematahkan anggapan atau tidak. Ini adalah perlanggaran undang-undang yang serius.

“Held, allowing the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence and acquitting and discharging the appellant:

(1) The appellants defence was not a simple denial. He gave an explanation on how he ended up with P27 and the explanation was not inherently incredible. The trial judge erred in describing the defence as a bare denial and in dismissing the defence on the ground the appellant could have picked any name from the passenger manifest to allege he was asked to check in the bag for that passenger. It was never put to the defence that such was the case (see para 16).

(2)The defence concerning Alizadeh, who was a real person, ought to have been considered by the trial judge as the appellant was entitled to an acquittal on the trafficking charge if he could show he was a mere possessor of the drugs whilst Alizadeh was the true trafficker. The trial judge failed to do so. Instead, she considered matters which were not in evidence and speculated that the appellant could have picked a name from the passenger list. Clearly, the trial judge failed to undertake the exercise expected of her under s 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code i.e. to evaluate all the evidence before her. She had failed to consider the defence fairly and sufficiently (see para 17).

(3)The trial judge had adverted to both presumptions under s 37(d) and (da) and also to s 2 of the DDA without electing whether the appellant was found to be in actual possession of the drugs and was presumed to be trafficking under s 37(da) or whether he was presumed to be in possession of the drugs under s 37(d) and was found to be trafficking under s 2 of the Act. If the presumptions had been resorted to in calling for the defence, the law required the trial judge to apply the balance of probabilities test to determine whether the appellant had rebutted the presumption. No such application of that test was found in the trial courts judgment (see para 20).”

59) Hujah- peninggalan (omission) ini adalah satu salah arah yang menimbulkan prejudis terhadap Perayu. Walaupun betul sekalipun anggapan yang digunapakai, kegagalan mendapati samada anggapan ini berjaya dipatahkan atau tidak adalah satu salah arah yang serius yang mewajarkan gangguan oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini. Sabitan yang diberikan tidak lagi selamat dan wajar diketepikan.

  

PENUTUP

1)    Berdasarkan keseluruhan keterangan dan alasan penghakiman, dihujahkan bahawa rayuan oleh pihak Perayu adalah bermerit. Mahkamah yang Mulia ini wajar mengenepikan keputusan Majistret serta melepas dan membebaskan Perayu daripada pertuduhan.

2)    Dengan rendah diri, pohon rayuan dibenarkan.